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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RALPH JENSEN and J. GOLDEN
JENSEN,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
O.K. INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; SIEGEL TRAILER
& AUTO FINANCE, a Utah corporation; TRAILER MART, INC., d/b/a
DAN'S CAMPERS, a Utah corporation;
HOMES AMERICAN STYLE, a Utah
corporation; the ESTATE OF MAX
SIEGEL, Deceased; DAN SIEGEL, an
individual; and JOHN DOES ONE
THROUGH THREE,

Case No.
12899

Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, in favor of plaintiffs-respondents, Ralph Jensen and J. Golden Jensen, and against defendants-appellants, Siegel Trailer and Auto Finance Co., Trailer
.Mart, Inc., d/b/a Dan's Campers 'N Trailers, Homes
American Style, Inc., the Estate of Max Siegel, de-
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ceased and Dan Siegel. Respondents brought an unlawful detainer action seeking to obtain damages and restitution of certain property occupied by two of the appellants, Trailer .l\Iart, Inc., d/b/a Dan's Campers 'N
Trailers (hereinafter referred to as "Dan's Campers"),
and llomes American Style, Inc. Respondents, owners
of the property in question, claim that 0.K. Investment
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "0.K.") leased
the premises from the respondents and subsequently
sublet the same premises to Dan's Campers; that O.K.
failed to exercise an option to renew provided for in
the lease agreement between respondents and O.K.,
(hereinafter referred to as "the original lease") ; and
that as a result of said failure the tenancy of the suhlessee, who had at all times been in continuous
sion of the premises, became a tenancy at w;ll as of the
date when the base term provided for in the original
lease expired.
Appellants assert that O.K. assigned its lease in
the premises to appellant, Dan's Campers; that Dan's
Campers thereafter became the tenant and lessee of
the respondents and was itself in a position to exercise
the renewal option. Appellants maintain that appellant,
Dan's Campers, did, as was its right, exercise the option
to renew and is now in lawful possession of the premises
under a valid and binding lease. In any event, it is the
position of appellants that the conduct of the respondents has been such as to estop the respondents to
deny that an assignment of the original lease occurred
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and that appellants are presently in lawful possession of
the premises.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
DISTRICT COURT
After the filing of a Complaint, an Answer and
Counterclaim, a Reply to Counterclaim, affidavits and
various other documents, respondents filed a written
motion for summary judgment and appellants made
oral motion for summary judgment at the hearing on
said mofon. On April 24, 1972, the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
State of Utah, Judge
James S. Sawaya presiding, denied appellants' motion
for summary judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of the respondents. Appellants thereafter
filed a notice of appeal and a supersedeas bond, which
stayed execution of the judgment pending this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGI-I'.r ON APPEAL
Appellants, Dan's Campers and llomes American
Style, Inc., seek to have reversed both the summary
judgment entered in favor of the respondents and the
denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment.
In the alternative, these appellants seek to have the
summary judgment entered in favor of respondents
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
Appellants, Siegel Trailer and Auto Finance, the
Estate of Max Siegel, and Dan Siegel, seek to have

the summary judgment entered in favor of respondents
reversed and judgment entered for these appellants dismissing the cause of action as to them, or alternatively to have the matter remanded for trial.
STA'l'El\IENT OF FACTS*
In June of 1948, .l\Iax Siegel organized appellant,
Siegel Trailer and Auto Finance Company, a Utah
corporation. Later, in November of 1952, he also organized appellant, Trailer .Mart, Inc., a Nevada corporation, which was authorized to do business in the
State of Utah in .January, 1968, under the name of
Dan's Campers 'N Trailers. l\lax Siegel was president,
director and major stockholder of both of these corporations from their inception until his death on .June 3,
19()9. Thereafter, his son, appellant, Dan Siegel, became president of both corporations and continues in
that capacity at the present time. During :March, 1971,
appellant, Dan Siegel, also organized appellant, Homes
American Style, Inc., a Utah corporation, as a modular homes marketing company. He has been a director
and president of that corporation from its organization
until the present date.
On January 1, 1968, respondents, owners of certain property located at approximately 6220 South
State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as more
particularly described in the record hereof, and O.K.
* Hereinafter the Record on Appeal is referred to as "R".
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executed a lease whereby sai<l premises were leased to
O.K. for an initial term of three years with three optional renewal periods which would extend the term of
the lease through December 31, 1988. The lease contained a con<lit;on prohibiting assignment or subleasing of the premises without the written consent of the
respondents. On the same day respondents consented in
writing to a transfer of the premises by O.K. for the
purpose of establishing a recreational vehicle dealership. Also on the same day, O.K. and l\Iax Siegel, acting for and on behalf of appellant, Dan's Campers, as
president thereof, entered into an agreement, entitled
"Lease" whereby the premises were transferred to appellant, Dan's Campers, for a period of one year with
one option to renew for an additional two years and
three additional options to renew which are identical
with those provided in the original lease. In every other
important particular the provisions of both leases are
identical.
On January 1, 1968, Dan's Campers went into
possession of the property and continues in possession
thereof as of today.
From and after January, 1968, through September, 1969, appellant, Dan's Campers, issued checks in
the amount of $225.00 per month for monthly rental
payments in favor of O.K. From October of 1969,
through December of 1970, appellant, Dan's Campers,
issued checks in the amount of $225.00 per month in
favor of the respondents for the payment of monthly
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rental and from January of 1971 through the present
date appellant, Dan's Campers, has issued or caused to
be issued checks in the amount of $250.00 per month
in favor of the respondents for the payment of monthly
rental as provided under the original lease.
On or before November 28, 1969, appellant, Dan's
Campers, received a copy of a letter written by respondent, Ralph Jensen, to Vista Liner, Inc., the successor corporation of 0.K., wherein respondent, Ralph
Jensen, requested that Vista Liner, Inc. ( O.K.) pay
the proportionate share of real property taxes for the
year 1969, as proYided under the original lease. The
letter contained a notation from a C. 'Vebster, an employee of Vista Liner, Inc., ( O.K.), suggesting that
appellant, Dan's Campers, deal directly with respondent, Ralph Jensen, and make arrangements with him
concerning the payment of real property and other taxes
for the aforementioned period. _On November 28, 1969,
Dan's Campers issued a check payable to vVestern Park
Services, a corporation to which Ralph Jensen directed
that property tax payments be made, in the amount of
$22.3.00 for the payment of real property taxes for the
year 1969.
On December 8, 1970, appellant, Dan's Campers,
sent a letter to respondent, Ualph Jensen, accompanied
by a check made payable to respondent, Ralph Jensen,
in the sum of $250.00 for the proportionate share of the
real property taxes due for the year 1970, and explaining that appellant, Dan's Campers, was exercising the
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option to renew the lease for the period of January I,
1971, through December 31, 1977, at the increased rental
of $250.00, as per the original lease.
During the spring of 1971, :Mr. Dan Siegel, as
president of Dan's Campers, contacted respondent,
Ralph Jensen, and met with him on the premises ..Mr.
Siegel explained at that time that he was desirous of
organizing a new company for the purpose of marketing modular homes and anticipated locating a modular
home display facility on a portion of the premises. He
also stated that two modular homes for display purposes
would be constructed on the leased property. Mr. Siegel
inquired of respondent, Ralph Jensen, as to whether
he would have any objection to the installment of such
permanent improvements on the property. Mr. Jensen
indicated his approval of such constn1ction upon and
improvement of the pre mi s e s. Thereafter, Homes
Amer;can Style. Inc. installed a sales office and located
two modular display homes on the premises at the substantial expense of approximately $40,000.00.
On or before November 10, 1971, appellant, Dan's
Campers, received a letter from respondent, Ralph Jensen, wherein said respondent requested payment of
$285.00 as Dan's Campers' proportionate share of real
property taxes due for the year 1971. Subsequently, at
Dan's Campers' direction, a check in that amount was
issued by Homes American Style, Inc. payable to respondent, Ralph Jensen.
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At all times herein mentioned all checks issued by
any of the appellants in favor of respondents for the
payment of monthly rental or property taxes have been
accepted by the respondents. None of such payments
have accrued in the least to the benefit of O.K.
On January 20, 1972, appellant, Dan Siegel, received a letter from the respondents claiming that appellant, Dan Siegel, or companies with which he is associated, was in possession of the premises as a monthto-month tenant and requesting that the premises be
vacated as of .l\Iarch 1, 1972. Prior to lhe date of that
letter, appellant, Dan's Campers, understood and believed in good faith that it was in possession of the
premises pursuant to an assignment of the original
lease by 0.K. Thereafter, during the first part of 1-i'ebruary, 1972, notice to vacate the premises was served
upon the appellants in possession of the premises and
subsequently this action was corrunenced.

POINT I
O.K. ASSIGNED ITS ENTIRE INTERES'l'

IN THE TERl\I OF THE ORIGINAL LEASE
TO APPELLANT, DAN'S CAJ\IPERS.

One issue raised in the lower court was whether the
second lease agreement (U. 91), entered into by O.K.
and l\I ax Siegel, for and in behalf of appellant, Dan's
Campers, is an assignment or a sublease. If this
agreement is an assignment, then appellant, Dan's
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Campers, which exercised the option to renew under
the original lease, is now in lawful possession of the
prem;ses under a valid and binding lease.
It is clear that by the terms of the original lease

(R. 104) O.K. covenanted with the respondents not to
assign the lease, nor sublease the premises, without the
written consent of the respondents. It is also clear that
as a part of the original lease, respondents gave written
approval to a transfer of the property by O.K. Based
on that written approval, O.K. and l\:Iax Siegel, acting
for and on behalf of appellant, Dan's Campers, entered
into the second lease agreement that same day. Pursuant to the second lease agreement, appellant, Dan's
Campers, with respondents' knowledge and consent,
went in to immediate and continuous possession of the
premises.
Respondents contend that the second lease agreement is a sublease and not an assignment. In ascertaining whether a transfer is an assignment or a sublease the legal effect produced, rather than the form
used, is determinative. In 3A Thompson on Real Property ( 19.59) (hereinafter cited as 3A Thompson) the
following is stated at 53:
The formal character of the paper or the
designation given the transaction in the contract is not important in determining whether
an instrument is a sublease or an assignment.
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The test for determining whether a transfer is an
assignment or a sublease is whether the language of the
agreement has the effect of conveying to another the
lessee's interest in the whole or any part of the premises
for the whole term or the une,rpired portion of the term,
leaving no reversion for himself. In other words, the
transfer is an assignment if the whole of the lessee's
original term, or the entire unexpired portion thereof,
is the subject of the transfer .
. . . '\Then the lessee's entire estate passes the
instrument is an assignment, though words of
demise are used, and rent and a right of reentry for nonpayment are reserved, or even
though it is called a sublease .... The test is
whether the grant leaves a reversionary interest in the original lessee or operates to transfer his entire term.

Thompson 53-54. There is substantial case authority for this view. In the case of
v. Trenton Oil
Co., 8() A.2d -t27 ( N .J. 1952), the plaintiff leased cer3.A

tain real property to "X" for fi''e years with an option
to renew for fiYe years upon sixty days notice. On the
same day "X" "sublet" the premises to defen<lant on
terms s:milar to the primary lease except that provision
was made for the defendant to renew the lease a year
at a time for not more than five additional years. The
plaintiff, who was the original lessor, consented to the
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sublease by "X" to defen<lant. In construing the second agreement as an assignment the court said at 429:

... It is clear that the subletting by the orig-

inal tenants to the oil company [defendant]
for the full term of the primary lease constituted an assignment . . . . Under circumstances such as those prevailing here, the
New Jersey rule is well settled that . . .
where the whole term of a lease is transferred by the lessee to a third party the instrument of transfer amounts to an assignment and not a sublease. The test is whether
the instrument dealing with the lease is to
pass the whole of the lessee's interest.
It necessarily follows that the oil company
[defendant] possessed the same privilege as
did the lessees of the primary lease to exercise the renewal opt i o n. (Citations
omitted).
In the case of Groth v. Continental Oil Co., 373
P.2d 548 (Idaho 1962}, the court, in ascertaining
whether a document was an assignment or a sublease,
stated as follows at 549-50:
A transfer or conveyance by a lessee of
h;s full term, or the remainder thereof, which
does not reserve to the lessee a reversionary
interest in the leasehold estate, has the legal
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effect of an assignment of the lease and is
not a suhlease. (Citations omitted).
"As a general proposition, if by the transaction the lessee conveys the entire term an<l
therehy parts with all reversionary interest in
the property, the transaction is construed to
be an assignment; but if there remains a reversionary interest in the estate conveyed, it is a
sublease * * * And at common law, a leasing
by the lessee for the entire term, even at a different rent, reserving the right of re-entry for
condition broken, as between landlord and the
sublessee, was regarded as an assignment of
the term." 32 Am. J1tr., Landlord and Tenant,
§ 314.
In JV ci11traub v. TV cingart, 277 P. 752 (Cal.
1929), the lessor refused to approve an assignment of
the lease hy the lessee. In an attempt to circumvent the
refusal. the lessee entered into an agreement with .a
third party under which the lessee held the lease in trust
for the use and benefit of the third party, who entered
into possession of the property. In determining that the
agreement between the lessee and the third party was an
assignment, the court stated at 756:
""Thether or not an instrument is to be
deemed an assignment of a lease is to be determined by the legal effect and not the form
of the instrument. The iaw qJways respects
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form less than substance. If its legal effect
is to substitute a third party for the lessee,
conferring upon him the right to the benefits
and subjecting him to the burdens of the lease
for the balance of the term thereof, without
providing for any reversionary interest in the
original lessee, it will be held to amount to an
assignment. (Citations omitted).
Furthermore, " ... [no] importance is attached to
the words 'demise' or 'lease' or to the form, covenants,
or conditions of the contract, if its legal effect be to
convey the entire term." Shcriden v. 0. E. Doherty,
Inc., 181 P. l(), l 7 ('iV ash. HH9). See also Bcdg.isoff v .
.1.1Iorgan, 162 P.2d 238, 241 (\Vash. 1945). In I/olden
v. Tidtt cll, 133 P. 54 (Okla. 1913), the court said at 55:
1

... The language employed or form used by
the parties in interest does not necessarily determine the character of the instrument or the
relation created thereby. The fact that a transfer may be in form a sublease or that it reserves
rights as against the transferee, similar to such
as are ordinarily reserved in a lease, is, as a
general rule, immaterial. Tiffany on Landlord
and Tenants, § 1.51; Underhill on Landlord
and Tenant, § 626.
As to the difference between an assignment and sublease see also State v. Meador, 874 P.2d 546 (Wash.
1962).
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The original lessee in the present case did in fact
convey to appellant, Dan's Campers, its entire leasehold
estate. No reversionary interest was retained by O.K.
A ppcllant, Dan's Campers, received from 0.K. precisely the same leasehold estate as 0. K. received from
the respondents. The second agreement, which appellant, Dan's Campers, mainrains is an assignment, varies
from the original lease in only four inconsequential particulars.
l<"'irst, the original lease provides for a monthly
rental of $225.00 until.January l, 1971, when the first
renewal period began at the increased rental of $250.00
per mm!th (see R. l 05) . The second lease agreement,
however, provides for a monthly rental of $225.00 1mtil
.January l, 1969, when the first renewal peliod under
the second agreement hegan at the increased rental of
$2:JO.OO per month (see R. 02). From January 1, 1971.
and thereafter, the rental amounts and renewal periods
are exactly the same in both agreements. In other words,
under the second agreement 0.K. reserved for itself
a greater monthly rental ( $2;j0.00 rather than $225.00)
for the two year period between January l, 1969 and
January l, 1971. It is generally agreed, however, that:
... [A] reservation of rent in an instrument
in the form of a lease will not change the
legal operation of the instrument as an assignment if the lessee parts with his entire interest
in the term ....

15
49 Am. Jur.2d 414 (1970).

This rule governs even if the original lessee reserves a
rental in excess of that provided for under the original
lease with the lessor. At 3A Thompson 53 it is stated:
. . . Although, by the underlease, a rent exceeding the original rent is reserved, and it is
expressly stipulated that the so-called undertenant shall hold as tenant of his grantor, he is
nevertheless in law the tenant of the original
lessor. If someone other than the lessee is in
possession and is paying rent there is a rebuttable presumption that he is an assignee.
In the instant case, under the terms of the second
agreement O.K. reserved for itself rental payments
which were to exceed the rental to be paid under the
original lease during part of the initial term of that
lease. The aforementioned rules operate to prevent such
a reservation of rent from rendering the second agreement a sublease, rather than an assignment. As a practical matter, however, the course of conduct engaged
in hy the parties in question renders consideration of
these rules unnecessary. Appellant, Dan's Campers, has
not at any time paid to any party a monthly rental in
excess of that called for in the original lease. O.K. did
not require and Dan's Campers did not pay the excess
rental provided for in the second agreement during the
first option period in the second agreement. Dan's
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Campers paid a monthly rental of $225.00 until January 1, 1971, when payments were increased to $250.00
pursuant to the original lease. Dan's Campers directed
its monthly rental payments to O.K. from January,
19()8, until September, 19G!l. After the latter date, and
until the present, Dan's Campers has caused monthly
rental payments to be made directly to respondents. Ily
January 20, 1972, when respondents requested the
parties in possession to vacate the premises, Dan's
Campers had caused payments to be made by check
directly to the respondents for twenty-eight months.
Respondents accepted, endorsed and cashed all of said
checks. l\foreover, on November 28, 1969, on December
8, 1970, and on November 10, 1971, Dan's Campers
caused checks to be issued in favor of respondent, Ualph
Jen sen, or parties designated by l\lr. Jensen, for the
payment of real property taxes assessed against the
premises in question. In at least one instance the tax
payment was :riiade specifically in response to a letter
from respondent, Ralph Jensen, to appellant, Dan
Siegel, requesting such payment (R. 54). In view of
the above discussion, it is evident that the first difference referred to between the original and second agreements is really no difference at all. It certainly does not
alter the substance of the second agreement as an assignment.
The second particular in which the second lease
agreement differs from the first is the addition of an
option period in the second lease which corresponds with
the last two years of the base term of the original lease
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agreement. Under the original lease the base term was
three years, while under the second lease the base term
was one year with an option to renew for two years.
Thereafter, the option periods provided in the two
agreements are identical.
This difference between the agreements is also immaterial. The additional option period provided in the
second lease agreement benefited only the appellant,
Dan's Campers. [tallowed Dan's Campers to terminate
the relationship under which it occupied the premises at
the end of one year, rather than at the end of three
years, as provided in the original lease. The difference
has no effect on the rights of parties other than Dan's
Campers and certainly does not amount to a reversionary interest in 0.K. Even if the second lease is construed by this court to be a sublease by its terms, once
the time had passed for exercising the first (additional)
option provided under the second lease, Dan's Campers
was in as assignee of the remainder of the original term,
because from that date the terms and option periods of
the two agreements are identical. See generally Dries v.
Trenton Oil Co., 86 A.2<l 427 (N.J. 1952).
The third particular in which the second lease
agreement difference from the original lease is the
omission from the second lease agreement of the italicized portion of the following sentence contained in the
original lease :
... Lessees agree to pay all assessments that
may arise out of the improvements on said
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property or of the streets or sidewalks surrounding it. to the end that the income from
the rental above .<1pccified may bf net to the
Lessors and not subject to deduction or e.r.pcnse of any kind connected with the ownership or maintenance of the propert.1J. (R. 107)
'fhe omission of this language from the second
lease agreement in no way increases or decreases the
obligations of Dan's Campers under the original lease.
The language omitted merely reinforces and repeats the
language in the first part of the quoted passage. This
difference, then, is insignificant and immaterial in the
construction of the second lease agreement as an assignment.
The fourth difference between the two agreements
is the inclusion of the following extra paragraph in the
second lease agreement:
That in the event the demised premises or
any part thereof shall for any reason be rendered untenantaLle without the fault or neglect
of the Lessee then and in that event the Lessee
shall han:' the opt;on of either cancelling and
terminating this lease or continuing to occupy
said premises at a rental reduced in proportion
to the extent of the untenantability of the
premises. ( R. 94)
This provision actually represents a benefit to the
assignee in excess of the benefits which O.K. enjoyed
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as lessee under the original lease and certainly does not
represent a condition or limitation upon the assignee,
Dan's Campers, which would amount to a reversionary
interest in the original lease so as to render the second
agreement a sublease.
None of the differences between the formal terms
of the two agreements has the effect of reserving to
0.K. a reversionary interest. On the contrary, the conduct of the parties, as well as the legal effect of the
language contained in the agreements, evidences exactly the opposite intent. At no time did the rent received by O.K. from Dan's Campers exceed the rent
owed by 0.K. to the respondents. The bulk of the rental
payments under the second agreement were made directly to the respondents. By the terms of the second
agreement Dan's Campers specifically assumed all of
the obligations of O.K. and thereby became the assignee
of the original lease and the substituted tenant of the
respondents. Also, 0.K. was never in possession of the
premises, a fact that must not be overlooked. From the
day the two agreements were entered into until the
present, Dan's Campers has been in continuous possession. Under such circumstances there is a presumption
of an assignment. 3A Thompson states at 45:

..• "\i\7 here one other than the lessee occupies
the leased premises during the continuation of
the term and pays rent, he is prima facia in
as an assignee of the term ....
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It may be state<l
a general rule that
where a person other than the lessee enters
upon and occupies leased premises or pays the
rent. the law infers an assigrunent to him of
the lease ....
Clearly, respondents have not offered to the court any
proof which would rebut the presumption nf an assignment that arose from appellants' occupancy of the
premises and direct payment of the rents reserved.

It might be asserted that the right of reentry reserved by 0.K. under the second agreement constitutes
a reversionary interest which renders the second agreement a sublease, rather than an assignment. llowever, a
right of reentry for nonpayment of rent or nonperformance of other covenants is not a reversion and does
not itself render a transfer by the lessee a sublease. At
3A Thompson 57-58 it is stated:
According to one view, a mere preservation of a new rent, or of a right of reentry for
breach of any of the conditions of the lease,
will not change the legal relations of the
parties. . . . The right of reentry is not an
estate or interest in land and it does not imply
a reservation of a reversion. It is merely a
chose in action.
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The transfer by a tenant of his entire interest in the
premises for the balance of the term constitutes an
assignment, even though a right of reentry for condition broken is retained by the tenant. In State v. lJIeador, 374
546 (\'Vash. 1962), the Supreme Court
of \V ashington held:
The transfer of a lessee's entire interest in
the premises for the balance of the term leaving no reversionary interest in the lessee, constitutes an assignment and not a sublease.
A right of reentry for condition broken is not
a reversionary interest and thus, although a
right of reentry for condition broken is re-·
tained, a transfer of the balance of a lessee's
term still constitutes an assignment. (Citations
omitted).
at 548. See also Sheriden v. 0. E. Doher(IJ, Inc., 181
P. 16 ('Vash. 1919). Also with respect to the effect of
a right of reentry on the nature of a transfer as a sublease or an assignment, the Supreme Court of Idaho,
in Groth v. Continental Oil Co., 373 P.2d 548 (1962),
quoted the following passage from Gilbert v. Yan
Kleeck, 1:i2 N.Y.2d 580, at 586:
"We do not believe that the differences
between the provisions of Dumenigo's lease
and the provisions of the original lease, which
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the trial court stresse<l, were of such character
as to effect the legal nature of the transaction.
For example, Dumenigo's lease contained a
covenant restricting the use of the premises to
a barber shop only, whereas the original lease
permitted the premises to be used for 'any legitimate business' with certain enumerated except;ons. There was no provision in the lease
for the enforcement of the covenant by a reentry upon the occurence of a breach but even
if such a right of reentry had been preserved,
it •would not hat'e been :rnf f icient to constitute
a reN:rsionary interest in Ferrara." Gillett
lln:is. v. Aristocrat Restaurant, Inc., 239 N.Y.
87, 145 X.E. 748, supra. (Emphasis added).
The reentry provision of the second agreement is
identical in all particulars to- the reentry provision of
the original lease.
As a further indication that Dan's Campers assumed all the rights, obligations and liabilities under
the original lease, 0.K. dropped completely out of view
once rental and tax payments were made directly to
respondents. On N ovemher 28, 1969, respondents addressed a letter to O.K. (R ..56) requesting payments
of l1l"Onertv taxes due for HHHl. 1\1r. C. \V- ebster. an
employee of 0.K., transmitted this letter to appellants
with a notation thereon requesting appellants to <leal
directly with the respondents with respect to the leased
premises. That notation read as follows:
•

I

•
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I suggest you get in contact w/ Ralph Jensen
and make your arrangements on the ground
direct along wI the taxes. [Signed C. Webster]
Thereafter, m November of 1971, respondent,
Ralph Jensen, addressed a letter (R. 54) directly to
appellant, Dan Siegel, requesting payment for property taxes due in 1971. A portion of that letter read as
follows:
It is tax time again. They seem to keep on going up & up. Your share this year will be
$285.00. . . . Thank you again in advance for
your remittance on the taxes. [Signed Ralph
Jensen]

0.K. retained no interest whatsoever in the premises. Dan's Campers took immediate possession, answered to the respondents for rent and taxes and covenanted precisely in the terms of the original lease. The
second lease agreement called for no surrender or delivery of the premises upon expiration of the second
agreement or upon expirat:on of any of the option periods provided for in the second agreement. The identity
of the provisions and covenants of the two leases attests
to the existence of a valid assignment between respondents and appellant, Dan's Campers.
The substance of the agreements in question and
the conduct of the parties compel an interpretation of
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the second agreement as a valid assignment of the
whole of O.K.'s interest in the premises in question to
appellant, Dan's Campers. The District Court erred in
ruling, as a matter of law, that the second agreement
was not an assignment of the original lease.
POINT II
BY TI-IEIR CONDUCT RESPONDENTS
ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY 'l'I-IAT DAN'S
CAl\IPERS IS NO'V IN POSSESSION UNDER
AV r\LID AND BINDING LEASE.
Sometime after the two agreements in question
went into effect, respondents embarked upon a course
of conduct which, if the original agreement is construed
by this court as an assignment, ratified that assignment
and waived the conditi0n in tb.e original lease against
assignment without the lessor's consent, or which, if
the original agreement is construed by this court as a
sublease, altered the character of the sublease and transformed it into an assignment of the remainder of O.K.'s
term. In either case respondents are now estopped by
their conduct to deny the validity of the assignment and
the present lawful possession by Dan's Campers as
assignee .
. . . A sublease [or an assignment] made without the lessor's consent may be validated and
made binding by agreement, acquiescence, or
ratification of the lessor, and such waiver [of
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a condition in the lease against assignment
without the lessor's cousent] may he Ly parole
or implied from the facts. The landlord, of
course, has the right to ignore tlmt breach. If
an assignee is led to act on the assumption that
the assignment will not be relied upon as a
ground for forfeiture, the lessor cannot subsequently enforce the forfeiture. And the lessor
may build up an estoppel against himself by
his conduct toward the lessee or his assignee ....
The rights of such third party do not depend upon the actual authority of the one with
whom he dealt, but upon the act of the owner
which precludes him from disputing the author·
ity he has apparently conferred ... After he
receives rent of an assignee with the knowledge
of the assignment, it is clear that the lessor
could not afterwards, consistently with good
faith, assert his right to enforce a forfeiture
for breach of a condition against assignment.
. . . Any act done by a landlord, knowing of
the cause of forfeiture, affirming the existence of the lease, and recognizing the lessee
as his tenant, is a waiver of such forfeiture.

aA Thompson 78-80.
The lessor's acceptance of payments of rent for
periods after expiration of the original lease has also
been recognized in a number of cases as constituting a
waiver of the requirement that an option to renew the

26
lease must be exercised by a stipulated time. See e.g.
llivcrs:dc Land (_,,'o. i'. Big Roch Stone & JJI aterial Co.,
40 S.,V.2d 423 ( ...'lrk. 1931); Admn v. Consolini, 64
A.2d 44 (Conn. 1949); Lingle v. JVainwright, 39 So.2d
843 (La. 1949); Noles v. JVinn Oil Co., 204 S.\V.2d
539 (Tenn. 1947).
It clearly appears that it was the intention of the
respondents that the payment of rent by Dan's Campers
should be a recognition of its right to hold the property
under the lease and a waiver of respondents' right to
enforce a forfeiture under the original agreement either
for noncompliance with the consent condition or for
fa:lure to timely renew. For fifteen months, from September, J9G9, through December, 1970, Dan's Campers
made monthly rental and property tax payments directly to one or both of the respondents. In December, 1970,
Dan's Campers notified respondents of its desire to
exercise the option to renew provided under the assigned
lease. Following the exercise of the option in January,
1971, Dan's Campers increased the monthly rental payments made to respondents to $250.00, pursuant to and
as provided in the assigned lease. Payments in that
amount continued until such time as respondents notified
Dan's Campers of its intention to terminate the lease
and such payments continue at the present time. A
total of thirteen monthly rental payments were made at
the increased amount called for in the assigned lease.
At no time did respondents ref use these payments or
direct that they be made by 0.K. rather than by Dan's
Campers. Respondents did not at any time notify Dan's
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Campers or imply in any way through their actions that
Dan's Campers had not properly exercised the renewal
option or that Dan's Campers was for any reason holding over as a tenant at will. Rather, respondents accepted increased rental payments beginning at the point in
time provided for under the assigned lease and continued
to require the payment by Dan's Campers of property
taxes pursuant to the assigned lease. In goo<l faith
reliance on the transfer of the lease by assignment and
respondents' acquiesence in and acceptance of that
assignment and also upon respondents' explicit consent,
and in the good faith belief that it was within its rights
in so doing, appellants made permanent improvements on the leased premises costing approximately
$40,000.00. Respondents were notified of the intention
of constructing these improvements and gave verbal
approval thereof. Hespondents allowed these improvements to be made following the date when Dan's Campers exercised its option to renew under the assigned
lease. Through their conduct, therefore, respondents
acquiesed in the assignment and the substitution of
Dan's Campers as tenant under the original lease and
continuously enjoyed the benefit of the income derived
from the rental payments. As a matter of fact, respondents did not desire to terminate the lease of Dan's Campers or ma;ntain that Dan's Campers was anything but
an assignee of the original lease until a third party
offered (R. 74) to pay respondents a greater monthly
rental for the property occupied by Dan's Campers under the assigned lease. Only then did respondents en-
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cleavor to "get out" of their original lease and assert
rights inconsistent with their past conduct. It would he
unconscionable to permit respondents to allow Dan's
Campers to assume possession under terms identical
with those of the original lease and become assignee of
that lease, and then at their pleasure renounce this
agreement in defiance of their own conduct and the
terms and nature of that agreement, because they found
a prospective tenant who will pay a greater monthly
rental.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel or
estoppel in pais is frequently applied to transactions in which it would be unconscionable to
permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one which he, or those by whose
acts he is bound, has acquiesced....
The rule is that where a party with full
knowledge, or with sufficient notice or means
of knowledge, of his rights and of all of the
material facts, remains inactive for considerable time or abstains from impeaching a contract or transaction, or freely does what
amounts to a recognition thereof as existing, or
acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation and so as to affect or interfere with the
relation and situation of the party, so that
the other party is induced to suppose that it
is recognized, this amounts to acquiescence and
the transaction, although originally impeachable, becomes unimpeachable.
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28 Am. Jur. 2d 673-675. Respondents herein, possessing full knowledge of all material facts, not only abstained from iu terfering with the relation and situation
of the parties and from requiring forfeiture for failure to adhere to any condition of the original lease, but
also engaged in affirmative conduct ratifying the assignment, or, if this court determ;nes that the second agreement was a sublease, transforming the sublease into an
assignment. The acceptance of rental income directly
from Dan's Campers, including the acceptance of the
increased amounts called for by the original lease, the
enjoyment of benefits therefrom, the direct communication with Dan's Campers with respect to property tax
payments, the assent to permanent improvements on
the premises and other numerous, personal, direct contacts and communications between respondents and
Dan's Campers with specific reference to the premises
in question all constitute such affirmative conduct recognizing, confirming, and assenting to the status of
Dan's Campers as a tenant under the original lease. 'fhe
fact that respondents delayed so long the repudiation
of the assignment between O.K. and Dan's Campers
and the status of Dan's Campers as a tenant under the
original lease indicates either an intention of the respondents to abandon their rights or a negligent failure
to assert their rights, if they had any.
With particular reference to the exercise by Dan's
Campers of the option to renew contained in the original
lease, respondents are estopped not only by their con-
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duct in acquiescence (acceptance of rental payments),
but also by their silence, to deny that Dan's Campers
properly exercised said option and is therefore presently
in lawful possession under a valid and binding lease.
Estoppel by silence arises where a person who, hy
force of circumstance, is under a duty to another to
speak, ref rains from doing so and thereby leads the
other to believe in the existence of a state of facts upon
which he acts to his prejudice. A. R. Clark Investment
Co. v. Green, 375 S.\\T.2d 425 (Tex. 1964). There is
a duty to speak where common honesty and fair dealing
demand it. 28 Am . .Tur. 669. A person who has been
silent when in conscience he ought to have spoken will
not be allowed to speak when conscience requires him to
he silent. Agmar v. Solomon, 261 P. 1029 (Cal. App.
1928); Jacobs v. Bernstein, 109 N.E. 1079 (N.Y. 1915).
By this standard respondents had a duty to advise Dan's
Campers that the option to renew had not been properly exercised, that Dan's Campers \Vas not in possession
under a valid and binding lease, and that Dan's Campers
was a tenant at will. lly failing to speak respondents
acquired an unfair advantage over Dan's Campers. As
though lying in wait, respondents allowed Dan's Campers to assume the position of an assignee and rely in
good fa.;th upon respondents' failure to declare a forfeiture under either the consent to assignment clause or
the option renewal clause. Then, at a time opportune to
them, respondents sprung upon the appellant, Dan's
Campers, to its complete surprise and great detriment.
Respondents' present repudiation of the renewal and
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the rights of Dan's Campers thereunder is unconscionable and should not be permitted by this court. To do
otherwise would permit one party, by its action and its
inaction, to change its position to the material prejudice
of the other.
Respondents have argued that in any event the
Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 (1953),
as amended, has been Yiolated and thus prohibits the enforcement of any obligation against the respondents.
In the case of Adams v. Taylor, 15 U.2d 296, 391 P.2d
837 ( 1964), Judge I-Ienroid, speaking for the Utah
Supreme Court, stated that where a property owner accepted monthly payments for approximately two years
from a1leged lessees who had made extensive improvements on the property the same was sufficient part performance to take an oral agreement for a five year
lease with an option to purchase out of the Statute of
Frauds and prevent the owner from construing the
tenancy of the alJeged lessees as a tenancy at will. Also,
the case of Tread·wcll v. llendcrson. 269 P.2d ll08
( N .lVI. 1954) contains the following language discussing the Statute of Frauds and the doctrine of equitable
estoppel:
" ... The most important 'ground of justice
and equity' admitted by courts of equity to uplift and displace the statute of frauds concerning legal titles to land, by fastening a liability
upon the wrongdoer, is fraud. There are many
instances in which equity thus compels the
owner of land to fore go the benefits of his legal
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title arnl to admit the equitable claims of
another, in 11irect contravention of the literal
requirements of the statute, but they all depend
upon the same principle."
[3 Pomeroy on
Equity §807]
The principle ad,rerted to in the above quotation that the statute of frauds may not be used
to shield one in the perpetration of a fraudulent act, is axiomatic. (Citations omitted).
". . . Although fraud is not an essential element of the original conduct working the
estoppel, it may with perfect propriety be said
that it would be fraudulent for the party to
reppdiate his conduct, and to assert a right or
claim in contravention thereof .... "
[19 Arn.
Jur., Estoppcl, §93]
Appellants urge that by their conduct and their
inaction respondents are estopped to assert the purported rights which they now
to assert, and that
the District Court erred in not concluding, as a matter
of law, that respondents are so estopped and that appellants were entitled to summary judgment on their motion.

POINT III
l\IATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST
'VI-IICH RENDER ERROR THE TRIAL
COURT'S .AvVARD UF SUl\11\IARY JUDGl\1ENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS.
The Utah Supreme Court has on many occasions
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described the narrow circumstances under which a trial
cow-t may grant a motion for summary judgment. In
the case of Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 U.2d 388, 367 P.2d
179 ( 1961), the court held that issues concerning the
intent of the parties constituted material questions of
fact precluding the award of a summary judgment.
The court stated at 184-.5:
The sustaining of summary motions without affording the party an opportunity to
present his evidence is a stringent measure
which courts should be reluctant to grant. It
should be borne in mind that although disposing of a case on such a motion may seem an easy
and expeditious method of dealing with litigation, it may not in fact be so. Unless the court
feels a high degree of assurance that such ruling is correct it may result in defeating that
purpose and actually protracting the litigation
by requiring an appeal and then having a trial
that should have been had in the first place.
Accordingly, the privilege of presenting evidence should be denied only when, taking the
view most favorable to the party's claims, he
could not in any event establish a right to redress under the law; unless it clearly so appears,
doubts should be resolved in favor of permitting him to go to trial. We have concluded that
this should have been done in the jnstant case,
and it is remanded for that purpose.
See also Frederick JJJay & Cu. v. Dunn, 15 U.2d 40,
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368 P.2d 26() (1HH2); Bullock v. Deserct Dodge Trucl.:
Center, Inc., 11U.2d1, 354 P.2d 550 (1060).

In pass=ng on a motion for summary judgment the
court may not try issues of fact between the parties, but
is limited to a determination of whether or not there is
a triable issue of fact and whether under the facts defendant is entitled to defend. 40 C.J.S. 304. This rule
has been held to apply "··here there is any doubt as to
the defense, or where facts are alleged by the defendant
which, if proved, would constitute a good defense to
the act; on. In Disabled A mcrican V cterans v. H endri,vson, 0 U.2d 1;52, 340 P.2d 416 ( 1050), an action to recm·er payments due on a contract, it was held that a
question of fact was presented as to whether the plaintiff was a corporation having a right to sue in its own
name. In that case the court stated:
On a motion for summary judgment
against the defendant, where some of the facts
are in dispute, a judgment can properly be
rendered against the defendant only if, on the
undisputed facts, the defendant has no valid
defense; if then any material fact asserted by
the plaintiff is contradicted by the defendant,
the facts as stated by the defendant must, on
such motion, be taken as true.
at 417. See also Hatch v. Sugarhousc Finance Co., 20
U.2d 156, 434 P.2d 758 (1067) (summary judgment
reversed and case remanded to determine quantity of
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legal services rendered and reasonable value therof) ;
Burnham v. Jlrrnkcr.lf Lifc & Ca.malt.lf Co., 24 U.2d 277,
470 P.2d 261 (1970) (summary judgment inappropriate where material issues of fact existed as to intent to
defraud and the materiality of a misstatement in an
insurance a pplica ti on) .
In In re 1f/illiams' Estates, 10 U.2d 83, 348 P.2d
683 ( 1960), the plaintiff contended that she could prove
that a contract of adoption existed between her natural
mother and persons by whom she was raised and who
treated her as their child and that although no decree
of adoption was ever obtained, she should be awarded
the same share in the estate of the purported adoptive
parents as she would clearly have received had an adoption decree been obtained, on the basis that equity regards
that as done which should have been done. The court
reversed the award of summary judgment against the
plai11tiff and remanded for consideration on the merits,
stating that the defendants had not satisfied the following standards:
A summary judgment is proper only if
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of ]aw. If the
proof which plaintiff claims she can produce
when considered in the light most favorable
to her would reasonably justify a finding by
clear and convincing evidence that there was an
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agreement to adopt, then there is a genuine
issue of material fact and the case must be reversed. \Ve conclude that without giving plaintiff the opportunity to present her evidence
in a trial we cannot hold as a matter of law
that plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
at 68;j-86.
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and on
appeal all evidence favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment has been rendered will be accepted
as true. Zuni Construction Co. ·u. Great American Insurance Co., 468 P.2d 980 (Nev. 1970). A litigant is
entitled to a trial on the merits where there is the slightest
doubt as to the facts. Short v. Riveria 1-Iotel, Inc., 378
P.2d 979 (Nev. 1963).
Appellants contend that if the question of the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, raised
by the appellants below in the pleadings and argued in
the l\Iemorandum in Support of Defendants' l\Iotion
for Summary Judgment ( R. 58) and during oral argument on the motion, is not a question for the court to
answer as a matter of law (because it is not possible to
draw but one reasonable inference from the evidence),
then the case must be remanded for a determination of
that question upon a trial of the facts. This rule is
stated more fully as follows:
. . . It is a firmly settled principle that the
question of the existence of an estoppel is a
question to be settled by the triers of the facts
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-that is, the jury in the event of a jury trial,
or the trial court in the event the proceedings
involve trial without a jury-where there is a
dispute as to the facts involving estoppel.
28 Am. Jur.2d 831. See also Sandoval v. Chenoweth,
410 P.2d 671 (Ariz. 1966); James v. Pawsey, 328 P.2d
1023 (Cal. A pp. 1958) ; Ruby v. UT ellington, 327 P .2d
586 (Cal. App. 1958).
Appellants maintain that at the very least genuine issues of material fact exist as to the necessary
elements constituting an equitable estoppel which preclude the rendering of a summary judgment in favor of
respondents. Respondents allege that they have never
consented in any manner to the assignment of the original lease to appellants (Complaint, R. 101) and appellants contend that respondents' course of conduct
amounted to a consent to and ratification of the assignment (Answe1· and Counterclaim, R. 83). Appellants
urge and contend that in any event sufficient facts
were presented in the Affidavit of Dan Siegel (R. 27)
to ·warrant a trial of the facts on the issue of equitable
estoppel. Those facts are discussed at Point I and Point
II above.
Respondents allege (R. 101) that they neither saw
nor gave approval to any terms set forth in the second
agreement. Appellants contend and offer to prove that
respondents knew, or should have known of the assignment and that they approved of the assignment by their
affirmative conduct and by their silence and acquie-
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scence. These claims raise genuine issues of fact. Did
respondents know that an assignment had occurred? If
so, respondents, in the event they disapproved of the
asigmnent, had a duty, imposed by honesty and fair
dealing, to advise the appellants of their disapproval
or forever be estopped to deny that an assignment had
occurred.
Respondents allege that the original lease expired
by its own terms on December 31, 1970, because the
original lessee did not renew the lease (R. 102). Appellants maintain that respondents' course of conduct estabrshed consent both to an assignment of the original
lease and to the exercise of the renewal option by Dan's
Campers. The question of whether the original lease
expired of its own terms or was extended by the exercise
of the renewal option by Dan's Campers, which was
assented to and ratified by the conduct of the respondents, is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.
Furthermore, the issue raised by paragraph 10 (R.
102) of Respondents' Complaint regarding the existence
of a periodic tenancy is another way of raising the issue
concerning the existence and validity of an assignment,
the resolution of which depends upon the applicability
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Other subsidiary fact issues involving equitable
estoppel exist. The issue raised by the l\lemorandum in
Support of Defendants' :Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the erection of permanent improvements on the property by appellants in reliance upon
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respondents' conduct, is a material issue of fact. In the
case of .i.lligliaccio v. Davis, 17 U.2d 397, 232 P.2d 195
(1951), the doctrine of equitable estoppel was deemed
applicable when an individual remains silent concerning
his interest in real property, allows another to expend
money on the same, and thereafter attempts to assert
his interest. The court said:
":Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is
the principle by which a party who knows or
should know the truth is absolutely precluded1
both at law and in equity, from denying or
asserting the contrary of, any material fact,
which, by his words or conduct, affirmative or
negative, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, he has induced another, who was
excusably ignorant of the true fact and who
had a right to rely upon such words and conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby, as a
consequence reaso11ably to anticipate, changing his position in such a way that he would
suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed." [19 Am. Jur. 634]
at 198. See also Grover v. Garn, 23 U.2d 441, 464 P.2d
598 ( 1970) ;
v. City and County of San Francisco, 225 P .2d 988 (Cal. App. 1951) ; .Teppson v. J eppson, 115 Utah 541, 206 P.2d 711 (1949); and Kessinger
v. Anderson, 196 P.2d 289 (\iVash. 1948).
Appellants, therefore, urge that the pleadings, affidavits and other documents filed by the parties in this
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case raise genuine issues of material fact which require
a trial of the facts and preclude summary judgment in
favor of respondents.

POINT IV
UNLA,VFUL DETAINER IS AN ACTION
AGAINST PEHSONS .ACTUALLY IN POSAND RESPONDENTS 'VOULD, IN
ANY EVENT, BE ENTITLED TO JUDGONLY AGAINST THOSE APPELLANTS ACTUALLY IN POSSESSION OF
TIIE
By its terms the unlawful detainer statute provides
a cause o.f action primarily against the tenant and, if a
person other than the tenant is actually in possession,
aga;nst the person actually in possession. Utah Code
Ann. §78-36-7 (1953) states in part: Necessary parties defendant. - No person other than the tenant of the premises, and
subtenants if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, need be made a party defendant in the
proceeding ... but when it appears that any of
the parties served with process or appearing in
the proceedings are guilty, judgment must
be rendered against them.
The provision which describes the offense of unlawful detainer also supports the conclusion that only
persons who are tenants or who are in actual possession
may be guilty of the offense.
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A tenant of real property, for a term less
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
( l) 'Vhen he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any
part thereof, after the expiration of the term
for which it is let to him ....

Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3 (1953).
In Pearce v. k\'hurtz, 2 U.2d 124, 270 P.2d 442
( 1954), the court said at 443:

Appellant contends that since Lewellen
was the only person liable on the promissory
note demand for payment should have been
upon him, that he should have been notified of
the forfeiture for default, and that he should
have been joined as party defendant in a suit
for possession based on the forfeiture. This
contention might he sound if the action were
other than unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer, however, is an action to remove a tenant
from possession and is primarily against the
person in po.ftsession. It is not similar to a quiet
title action wherein anyone with any interest
should be joined.
'Vith respect to the same subject the court also
said the following in 1-lolladay Coal v. Kirker, 57 P.
882 (Utah 1899), at 884:
. . . Under our statute, none but a tenant of
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real property for a term less than life can be
guilty of unlawful <letainer.
In the instant action the only parties against whom
judgment might possibly be rendered under the standards discussed above are Dan's Campers and Ilomes
American Style, Inc., the parties in actual possession
at the time the action was commenced. Clearly judgment should not be upheld against Siegel Trailer and
Auto }'inance Co., the Estate of l\1ax Siegel, and
Dan Siegel, inasmuch as they were never in possession
of the premises and have never claimed a possessory interest in the property and thus cannot be guilty of unlawful detainer. Appellants, Siegel Trailer and Auto
Finance Co., the Estate of l\lax Siegel, and Dan Siegel
urge that they, as uninvolved and disinterested parties,
must be excluded from the effect of any such judgment.
CONCLUSION
Apppellants, Trailer l\1art, Inc., d/b/a Dan's
Campers 'N Trailers, I-Iomes American Style, Inc.,
Siegel Trailer and Auto Finance, Inc., the Estate of
l\Iax Siegel, deceased, and Dan Seigel, urge this Honorable Court to reverse the award by the District Court
of a summary judgment in favor of the respondents
since, as a matter of law, the second lease agreement
constituted an assignment of the original lease. In addition, the course of conduct of the respondents during
the period of time in question estops the respondents
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from denying that the appellants in possession of the
premises, Dan's Campers and its undertenant, Homes
American Style, Inc., have a valid leasehold interest in
the premises.
Alternatively, if this Court determines that the
second lease agreement is not pro tanto an assignment
of the original lease, or that the appellants are not entitled to a determination of the applicability of the defense of equitable estoppel as a matter of law, appellants urge that the record herein raises a number of genuine issues of material fact so as to require a trial of
this matter on its merits.
Appellants, Seigel Trailer and Auto
Inc.,
the Estate of l\iax Siegel, deceased, and Dan Siegel,
urge this Court that a cause of action for unlawful
detainer does not exist as to these parties, since they
have never claimed or enjoyed any interest in the premises herein in question, possessory or otherwise. It is
therefore urged that the Court reverse the judgment as
to those appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard L. Blanck
John M. Bradley

Attorneys for Certain
Defendanta-AppeUants

